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I. INTRODUCTION
The right to freedom of expression, protected both by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution' and by Article I,
Section 4 of the Illinois Constitution,2 is one of the most treasured
individual liberties in our society. Similarly, the rights of private
property owners are held in the highest regard.4 Thus, when a per-
son seeks to exercise his or her right to freedom of expression on
the property of another who wishes to prevent the speech or activ-
ity, an inevitable tension between the competing rights arises.5 Be-
cause the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment
operates only as a limitation on government,6 a private property
owner's right of exclusion takes precedence over the free speech
rights of others unless the property assumes a "public function,"
thus subjecting the property to state regulation.7
1. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 4 provides: "[a]ll persons may speak, write and publish freely,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. In trials for libel, both civil and criminal,
the truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient
defense."
3. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) ("Those who won our independence.., believed that freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth .. "); Chicago Park Dist. v. Lyons, 237 N.E.2d 519, 522 (Ill.) ("[Flree speech and
a free press are fundamental personal rights and liberties thought by those who drafted
our State and Federal constitutions to lie 'at the foundation of free government by free
men.'" (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939))), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 939 (1968); City of Blue Island v. Kozul, 41 N.E.2d 515, 519 (Ill. 1942) ("The
freedom[s] of speech and of the press.., are fundamental personal rights and liberties,
and are essential to a free government by free men."); see also Curtis J. Berger,
PruneYard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 635,
637 (1991) [hereinafter Berger] ("The imperative of an informed, politically conscious
electorate requires access to information and opinion .... Political expression, 'uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open,' is the vital fluid of a free, participatory society." (quoting
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))).
4. Both the federal (U.S. CONST. amend. V) and state constitutions (ILL. CONST. art.
I, § 15) protect persons from the uncompensated taking of private property by the gov-
ernment. See also Berger, supra note 3, at 635-36 (noting that "the gospel of private
ownership regards as fundamental the right to control entry to one's land").
5. See Berger, supra note 3, at 635.
6. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925); see also Kozul, 41 N.E.2d at 517 (stating "the freedom of speech and of the
press secured by the first amendment against abridgement by the United States is simi-
larly secured to all persons by the fourteenth amendment against abridgement by a State"
(citations omitted)).
7. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 513-15, 520; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506-07, 509
(1946).
People v. DiGuida
Until recently, the conflicting rights of property owners and per-
sons asserting their right to free speech under Article I, Section 4
of the Illinois Constitution (the "free speech provision") had never
been addressed. Rather, parties generally addressed this conflict
under the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the
last two decades, however, the United States Supreme Court has
foreclosed First Amendment protection of the right to free speech
on private property in all but the narrowest of circumstances.8
Consequently, those seeking to exercise free speech rights on pri-
vate property have turned to the free speech provisions of state
constitutions for protection. 9
In People v. DiGuida,'I the Illinois Supreme Court examined for
the first time whether the Illinois Constitution prohibits property
owners from using the Illinois trespass statute" to exclude from
their property a person seeking to engage in speech or expressive
activity. The court concluded that the Illinois free speech provi-
sion does not protect expression on the private property of
another. 12
8. The only situation in which the U.S. Supreme Court has invoked the public func-
tion doctrine to grant a right of free speech on private property involved a company-
owned town. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502, 507-09; see also infra notes 13-27 and accom-
panying text for a more thorough discussion of the limited application of the public func-
tion doctrine.
9. See A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 875-76, 878 (1976) [hereinafter Howard] (particularly
noting the independent path taken by the California Supreme Court); see also Berger,
supra note 3, at 651 (discussing "the need for state law to supplement the Court's limited
view of a constitutionally protected forum"); Thomas B. McAffee, The Illinois Bill of
Rights and Our Independent Legal Tradition: A Critique of the Illinois Lockstep Doctrine,
12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 3 (1987) [hereinafter McAffee] (stating that "[i]n the face of retrench-
ment by the Burger Court ...state courts have increasingly departed from Supreme
Court decisions applying federal provisions that are substantially identical with state con-
stitutional counterparts"); Roger Kangas, Comment, Interpreting the Illinois Constitu-
tion: Illinois Supreme Court Plays Follow the Leader, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1271 (1987)
[hereinafter Kangas] (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the
Illinois Constitution as an independent source of protection); cf People v. Tisler, 469
N.E.2d 147, 164 (Ill. 1984) (Clark, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]oday, the United
States Supreme Court has been cutting back on the individual liberties provided by the
Warren court, while State supreme courts have attempted to protect civil liberties in State
constitutions" (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1065 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting))).
10. 604 N.E.2d 336 (Ill. 1992), rev'g 576 N.E.2d 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). This Note
will refer to the appellate court opinion as "DiGuida I" and to the Illinois Supreme
Court opinion as "DiGuida 11." Although the appellate court incorrectly failed to capi-
talize the G in Mr. DiGuida's name, the Illinois Supreme Court used the correct capitali-
zation. References to the decisions of both courts will therefore follow the version used
by the supreme court.
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 21-3(a) (1987).
12. DiGuida 11, 604 N.E.2d at 344-47.
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This Note addresses the inconsistencies in the Illinois Supreme
Court's interpretation of the "state action" requirement of the Illi-
nois free speech provision. Section II provides background for the
opinion of the Illinois court by identifying persuasive authority
under both state and federal constitutional law and by examining
the legal history of the Illinois free speech provision. Section III
discusses the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in DiGuida, and
Section IV provides a critical analysis of the approach taken and
conclusion reached by the Illinois court. Finally, Section V as-
sesses the impact of the DiGuida opinion not only for free speech
rights under the Illinois Constitution but also for the "lockstep"
and state action doctrines.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Free Speech Rights Under the First Amendment
In Marsh v. Alabama,3 the United States Supreme Court for the
first time addressed the question of whether the First Amendment
confers the right to engage in speech on the property of another.
In Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness seeking to distribute religious litera-
ture in Chickasaw, Alabama, a company-owned town, was arrested
for trespassing. 4 The Court first determined that the speaker's ac-
tivity would have been protected by the First Amendment if it had
occurred on public property.1 5 In holding that the state violated
the speaker's First Amendment rights by permitting the property
owner to prohibit the speaker's activity, the Court stressed that the
company town functioned just as any other American town.1 6 The
Court therefore established the doctrine that when private prop-
erty becomes the functional equivalent of a municipality, the Four-
teenth Amendment's limitations on state activity apply to the
property owner. 17
Two decades later in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local
13. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
14. Id. at 503-04.
15. Id. at 505. Prior Supreme Court opinions established that a municipality does
not have a general right to prohibit speech or expressive activity on its streets, sidewalks,
and public places merely by virtue of its ownership of the property. Id. at 504-05 (citing
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943)).
16. Id. at 502. A private corporation not only owned the homes and stores in the
business district but also owned and operated the streets, the sewer system, and a sewage-
disposal plant. Id.
17. Id. at 507-09. Marsh provided the first application of the "public function" doc-
trine to the area of First Amendment rights. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513-14
(1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 561 (1972); JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW § 12.2, at 457-59 (4th ed. 1991) [hereinafter NOWAK]; James Marcus
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590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. ,18 the "public function" concept
was extended to include large shopping centers. '9 The Court based
this extension on its finding that the shopping center functioned as
a community business block just as the business district did in
Marsh .20 Following the public function doctrine announced in
Marsh, the Court held that the state could not permit the private
owners of the shopping center to prohibit picketing activity that
would have been protected by the First Amendment if it had been
conducted on public property. 2' Logan Valley marked the greatest
extent to which the Supreme Court was willing to expand protec-
tion for expressive activities on private property; subsequent deci-
sions restricted the application of the public function exception.
The first step in checking the expansion of the public function
doctrine came in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.22 Although Lloyd did not
expressly overrule Logan Valley, the Court avoided the constraints
of the Logan Valley decision by distinguishing the operative facts
Boman, Note, Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center: Free Speech Access to Shopping
Centers Under the California Constitution, 68 CAL. L. REV. 641, 646-47 (1980).
The public function doctrine provides an exception to the general rule that private
persons are not subject to the limitations that the Federal Constitution places on federal
and state governments. It holds that when a private actor assumes the role of the state by
assuming a function traditionally associated with government or operated almost exclu-
sively by government, the private actor is subject to the same limitations that the Federal
Constitution places on federal and state governments. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 513-14; NO-
WAK, supra, § 12.2, at 457-58.
18. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
19. Id. at 318, 325. This extension was not without its critics on the Court. Justice
Black, who had written the Court's opinion in Marsh, criticized the majority's conclusion
that the shopping center in Logan Valley was the equivalent of the company town in
Marsh. Id. at 330-31 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black commented that the unique
characteristics of the property in Marsh -property that "encompassed an area that for all
practical purposes had been turned into a town"-were missing in Logan Valley. Id.
The Supreme Court's later opinions in Lloyd and Hudgens vindicated Justice Black's
viewpoint. See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 518 (stating that "the ultimate holding in Lloyd
amounted to a total rejection of the holding in Logan Valley"); Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 570
(holding that "there has been no such dedication of Lloyd's privately owned and operated
shopping center to public use as to entitle respondents to exercise therein the asserted
First Amendment rights").
20. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 318-19.
21. Id. at 318-19, 325. The Court noted that its holding did not confer a general
right of access to all parties seeking to picket on the shopping center's property. Id. at
320-21. For example, the Court indicated that if expressive activity were to interfere with
the owner's or the public's ordinary use of the property, the state could prevent picketing
even if it occurred on state-owned property generally open to the public. Id. The shop-
ping center was not permitted to deny the picketers in Logan Valley access because the
property was generally open to the public and the picketers exercised their First Amend-
ment rights in a manner and for a purpose consistent with the property owner's and the
public's use of the property. Id. at 319-23.
22. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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in that case.23 The Court held that because the owner had not
dedicated its property to public use, the public did not have a First
Amendment right to engage in expressive activities on the
property.24
The implications of the Supreme Court decision in Lloyd were
clarified in Hudgens v. NLRB.25 In Hudgens, the Supreme Court
held that although it had factually distinguished Logan Valley
from Lloyd,26 the latter opinion "amounted to a total rejection of
the holding in Logan Valley."'27 By interpreting Lloyd as having
effectively overruled Logan Valley, the Supreme Court eliminated
from the public function exception the shopping center at issue in
Logan Valley. Thus, Marsh v. Alabama is the only case in which
the Supreme Court's application of the public function exception
still stands.
The Supreme Court's most recent examination of First Amend-
ment protection for speakers on private property involved the ap-
plication of a state constitutional free speech provision.28 In
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Court was asked to re-
verse a California Supreme Court decision 29 that had held that the
California Constitution protected the right of a group of speakers
to engage in expressive activity in a privately owned shopping
mall.30 In affirming the decision of the California Supreme Court,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that although the speakers' rights in
PruneYard would not have been protected by the First Amend-
23. Id. at 563-67. The Court noted that unlike the situation in Lloyd, in Logan Val-
ley the speech had been directly related to the use of the property and that no other
forums were available to the speakers. Id. at 563-64, 566-67.
24. Id. at 570. The Court rejected the argument that because the shopping center at
issue was open to the public, it served the same purpose as a business district and there-
fore had been dedicated to public use. Id. at 569-70. Instead, the Court held that "prop-
erty [does not] lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited to
use it for designated purposes. Few would argue that a free-standing store ... assumes
significant public attributes merely because the public is invited to shop there." Id. at
569.
25. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
26. Id. at 517-18.
27. Id. at 518; see also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 846 (1992) (stating
"in Hudgens we made it clear that Logan Valley was overruled"); PruneYard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-81 (1980) (stating that "[i]n rejecting [the respondents'
claim in Lloyd,] we substantially repudiated the rationale of Food Employees v. Logan
Valley Plaza, which was later overruled in Hudgens v. NLRB" (citations omitted)).
28. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
29. See Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447
U.S. 74 (1980).
30. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 78.
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ment,3 1 states were nevertheless permitted to provide greater pro-
tection for expressive activities under their own constitutions.32
The only limitations on such protection, the Court held, were
those imposed by the Federal Constitution. 33 Thus, if a state's con-
stitutional protection of its citizens' speech were to violate a prop-
erty owner's rights under the First or Fifth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, then the state constitution's free speech pro-
vision would be invalid.3 4 The PruneYard Court concluded, how-
ever, that the speakers' activity of soliciting signatures for a
political petition in the courtyard of a large, privately owned shop-
ping center constituted neither a taking of property under the Fifth
Amendment nor a violation of the owner's First Amendment
rights.35
B. Free Speech Rights Under Other State Constitutions
Since the U.S. Supreme Court decision in PruneYard, many
state supreme courts have considered whether their state constitu-
tions confer upon speakers a right to engage in speech on the pri-
vate property of another.36 Although no state supreme court has
yet held that its state constitution provides a general right to
speech on private property regardless of the circumstances, neither
has any state yet denied protection for expressive activity on pri-
vately owned property under all circumstances. The states that
have interpreted their constitutions' free speech provisions37 in the
context of the right to speech on private property fall roughly into
31. Id. at 81.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. PruneYard, 477 U.S. at 84, 87-88.
36. See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 624 (N.J. 1980) ("Defendant asserts that
under the [New Jersey] State Constitution he is afforded protection of his expressional
rights even if it is not clear that the First Amendment would serve to grant that
protection.").
37. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has found a right to conduct cer-
tain activities on private property under a provision of its state constitution other than its
free speech provision. See Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 595
(Mass. 1983) (applying the state constitution's provision concerning the right to free and
equal elections to protect a speaker's right to gather signatures for a political petition at a
privately owned shopping mall).
Similarly, the right to collect signatures on initiative petitions has been found to limit
property owners in Oregon from excluding persons seeking to exercise this right. See
State v. Dameron, 789 P.2d 707 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Cargill, 786 P.2d 208, 215
(Or. Ct. App. 1990). The application of provisions other than free speech provisions
exceeds the scope of this Note.
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two categories:38  (1) states for which the question of state action is
determinative; and (2) states that require a situational analysis of
the degree to which the property owner has opened that property
to the public.39
1. Jurisdictions Requiring State Action to Invoke
Constitutional Protection for Expression
On the basis of the principle that their state constitutions protect
speakers only from government activity, twelve states4° have de-
nied the protection of their constitutions' free speech provisions to
38. One state supreme court's interpretation of its free speech provision defies catego-
rization. The North Carolina Supreme Court held without comment that the state's free
speech provision did not protect the activities of a protestor who was soliciting signatures
for a petition against the draft in the parking lot of a large privately owned mall. See
State v. Felmet, 273 S.E.2d 708, 712 (N.C. 1981).
Most courts and commentators have classified each decision in the line of shopping-
center cases by comparing the decision with the shopping-center decisions of other juris-
dictions, rather than on the basis of its effect on free speech rights on private property
generally. See, e.g., Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen.
Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1339 (Pa. 1986) (noting that "[u]nlike California, Massa-
chusetts and Washington, other sister jurisdictions in addressing these situations have
reached the result we do today" (citing Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 469 A.2d 1201
(Conn. 1984) and Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337 (Mich.
1985))); Berger, supra note 3, at 634 n.10 (dividing the states into two groups: one in
which mall owners have "prevailed," the other in which mall owners have "lost").
This Note seeks to address the broader scope of the protection afforded expression on
all types of private property by the Illinois free speech provision, and thus categorizes the
decisions of other jurisdictions by their implications for a more general right to free
speech on all private property.
39. This second category includes decisions from courts in Oregon and Pennsylvania.
See State v. Purdue, 826 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Huffman & Wright Log-
ging Co. v. Wade, 817 P.2d 1334, 1338 & n.6 (Or. Ct. App. 1991); Cargill, 786 P.2d at
215; Western Pa. Socialist Workers, 515 A.2d at 1333, 1336; Commonwealth v. Tate, 432
A.2d 1382, 1390 (Pa. 1981). Although courts in these states have held that state action is
required to invoke the protections of their states' free speech provisions, they have gener-
ally provided a much broader exception to the state action requirement than have the
states in the first category. See infra notes 53-71.
40. See Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm., 767 P.2d 719, 723-24 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1988); Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 469 A.2d at 1208-09; Citizens for Ethical
Gov't, Inc. v. Gwinnett Place Assocs., 392 S.E.2d 8, 10 (Ga. 1990); Estes v. Kapiolani
Women's and Children's Medical Ctr., 787 P.2d 216, 221 (Haw. 1990); Woodland v.
Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d at 348; State v. Scholberg, 412 N.W.2d 339, 343-
44 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1215,
1217-18 (N.Y. 1985); City of Cleveland v. Sundermeier, 549 N.E.2d 561, 564 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1989); City of Columbus v. Kasper, No. 87AP-508, 1987 WL 31290, at *2 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1987); Charleston Joint Venture v. McPherson, 417 S.E.2d 544, 548
n.7 (S.C. 1992); Gibbons v. State, 775 S.W.2d 790, 793-94 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989);
Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 780 P.2d 1282, 1285,
1288, 1292 (Wash. 1989); Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 837, 845, 848 (Wis. 1987).
But see Ferner v. Toledo-Lucas County Convention and Visitors' Bureau, Inc., No. L-91-
236, 1992 WL 185683, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 7, 1992).
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speakers on private property under virtually all circumstances.4 '
In Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs. ,42 for example, the Connecticut
Supreme Court refused to look simply to the plain text of the Con-
necticut free speech provision4 3 to determine whether members of
the Connecticut National Organization for Women could enjoin
the owners of a large shopping mall from denying them access to
the mall to solicit signatures for a petition on the proposed Equal
Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." Instead, the court
examined the history of the adoption of the Connecticut Bill of
Rights and determined that its framers had intended the state con-
stitution to protect individual liberties from government interfer-
ence only.45
Moreover, the court found unpersuasive the speakers' argument
that the lack of specific language referring to government action in
the free speech provision created free speech rights that could be
exercised on all private property.46 As the court pointed out, it had
previously concluded that the Connecticut equal protection
clause47 contained a state action requirement, despite wording
"stated in absolute terms similar to [the free speech provision]."4
The court then followed the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Lloyd,
concluding that there was no state action because the public func-
41. On the basis of the textual similarities between the First Amendment and the free
speech provisions of their states, Hawaii, Ohio, and South Carolina have held that their
free speech provisions provide exactly the same protection for expressive activity on pri-
vate property as that which is available under the First Amendment. See Estes, 787 P.2d
at 221; Sundermeier, 549 N.E.2d at 564; Charleston Joint Venture, 417 S.E.2d at 548 n.7.
Appellate courts in Minnesota and Texas have held that their free speech provisions
are to be interpreted as affording exactly the same protections as those provided by the
First Amendment, but they have not based their conclusions on textual analyses. See
Scholberg, 412 N.W.2d at 344 (basing its conclusion upon the finding that the Minnesota
Supreme Court historically had been "cautious" about interpreting the state constitution
more expansively than the Federal Constitution); Gibbons, 775 S.W.2d at 793-94 (basing
its holding simply on its conclusion that "Texas constitutional principles guaranteeing
freedom of expression are coextensive with the federal guarantees"). But see Zarsky v.
State, 827 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (evaluating whether the Texas free
speech provision protected the activities of an abortion-rights activist on private property
by considering, inter alia, the size of the property, the degree to which the public was
invited to use the property, and the disruptiveness of the speaker's activities).
42. 469 A.2d 1201 (Conn. 1984).
43. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 4 provides: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."
44. Cologne, 469 A.2d at 1208-09.
45. Id. at 1207-08.
46. Id. at 1208-09.
47. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20.
48. Cologne, 469 A.2d at 1209.
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tion doctrine did not extend to shopping centers.49 Quoting from
Lloyd, the Connecticut court held that the mall did not "lose its
private character merely because the public is generally invited to
use it for designated purposes."5
Similarly, courts in Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan, Min-
nesota, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and
Wisconsin have followed Connecticut in ruling that the free speech
provisions of their state constitutions contain a state action re-
quirement." Nearly all of the courts in this group have adopted
the First Amendment's state action standard and the public func-
tion exception to that requirement established by the Supreme
Court in Marsh and Lloyd.5 2
2. Jurisdictions Using a Balancing Approach to Determine
Constitutional Protection for Expression
Six states53 have concluded that their free speech provisions may
provide protection to speakers on private property regardless of the
public function exception or the presence of actual governmental
interference.54 These courts have ruled that the conflict between
49. Id. at 1205, 1210.
50. Id. at 1210 (quoting Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 569).
51. See supra note 40.
52. See Fiesta Mall, 767 P.2d at 724; Cologne, 469 A.2d at 1210; Gwinnett Place
Assocs., 392 S.E.2d at 9-10; Estes, 787 P.2d at 221; Scholberg, 412 N.W.2d at 343; SHAD
Alliance, 488 N.E.2d at 1217; Sundermeier, 549 N.E.2d at 564; Charleston Joint Venture,
417 S.E.2d at 548; Gibbons, 775 S.W.2d at 793-94; Southcenter Joint Venture, 780 P.2d at
1292; Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at 837, 845-46. The Supreme Court of Michigan, however,
has characterized the public function exception to the state action requirement of the
First Amendment as "subterfuge" and has expressly refused to adopt this doctrine as an
exception to the state action requirement of the Michigan Constitution's free speech pro-
vision. Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 351.
53. See Johnson v. Tait, 774 P.2d 185, 188-90 (Alaska 1989); Robins v. PruneYard
Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Bock v. West-
minster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 61 n.7, 62-63 (Colo. 1991); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615,
632-33 (N.J. 1980); State v. Purdue, 826 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Huffman &
Wright Logging Co. v. Wade, 817 P.2d 1334, 1338 & n.6 (Or. Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Cargill, 786 P.2d 208, 215 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Cam-
paign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1333 (Pa. 1986); Commonwealth
v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1390 (Pa. 1981).
54. Only two of these states, Oregon and Pennsylvania, have acknowledged a state
action requirement in their free speech provisions. See Purdue, 826 P.2d at 1038 (stating
that Oregon's free speech provision "protects expressive activity from intrusion by any
branch of government"); Western Pa. Socialist Workers, 515 A.2d at 1335. Oregon and
Pennsylvania are, nevertheless, properly placed in this category because both states rec-
ognize broad exceptions to the state action requirement. See Purdue, 826 P.2d at 1039
(holding that the right to refer to activities as "constitutionally protected" turned on
whether "the parking lot had ... acquired the characteristics of a public forum"); Tate,
432 A.2d at 1390 (holding that where a private college invited the public onto its prop-
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the fundamental rights of speakers and those of property owners
requires an independent analysis of the particular facts of each
situation.55
California was the first state to hold that its free speech provi-
sion5 6 affords greater protection than the First Amendment. In
Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center,7 the California Supreme
Court first determined that the U.S. Supreme Court rulings in
Lloyd and Hudgens did not prevent California from providing
broader protection under the free speech provision of its state con-
stitution than the protection offered to speakers under the First
Amendment. 58  The court then considered whether the California
Constitution protected the right of citizens to gather signatures for
a political petition on property owned by a private shopping
center. 5
In holding that the California free speech provision did indeed
protect the speakers' rights to expressive activity at the shopping
center, the court emphasized that in contrast with the text of the
First Amendment, the text of the California provision "broadly
proclaims speech and petition rights."' 6 The court further noted
that its prior decisions had established that free speech rights take
precedence over private property interests in many situations. 61
Finally, the court pointed to evidence that private shopping centers
had replaced traditional business districts62 and concluded that
policy considerations supported the principle that shopping centers
''provide an essential and invaluable forum for exercising [speech
erty and provided a "public forum" for speech, the college could not prohibit speakers
from engaging in expressive activity).
55. See, e.g., Schmid, 423 A.2d at 630 (applying a "multi-faceted test ... to ascertain
whether in a given case owners of private property may be required to permit, subject to
suitable restrictions, the reasonable exercise by individuals of the constitutional freedoms
of speech and assembly"); see also Tait, 774 P.2d at 188-90; Bock, 819 P.2d at 61 n.7
(stating that the state free speech provision did not contain the same state action require-
ment as the First Amendment).
56. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 provides: "Every person may freely speak, write and
publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right.
A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."
57. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979), aff'd 447 U.S.
74 (1980).
58. Id. at 344. This portion of the California Court's opinion was affirmed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). For
a more thorough discussion of PruneYard, see supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
59. Robins, 592 P.2d at 342, 346.
60. Id. at 347.
61. Id. at 346-47.
62. Id. at 345.
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and petition] rights. 63
Still, the California court did not give speakers "free rein" to
exercise their speech rights on private property."4 Instead, the
court held that free speech rights are protected from private action
only when (1) at the property owner's invitation, the public uses
the property to such a degree that the private property assumes a
"public character, ' 65 and (2) the speaker exercises the right to ex-
pressive activity reasonably without interfering with the owner's
use of the property.66 The court further hinted that the size of the
property might also factor into the determination of whether the
expressive activity is protected.67
After the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed 61 the Robins decision,
several other states followed California's lead. For example, the
New Jersey Supreme Court found that the free speech provision of
its state constitution 69 protects the reasonable exercise of free
speech rights from transgression by private parties.70 As in Robins,
the New Jersey court limited free speech rights to accommodate
the interests of property owners. 7' Thus, under the approach
adopted by both California and New Jersey, each situation must be
evaluated independently, and the outcome is driven not by whether
state action is present but by balancing the interests at stake.
63. Id. at 347.
64. Robins, 592 P.2d at 347.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 347-48.
67. Id. The court stressed that it did "not have under consideration the property or
privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail establish-
ment." Id. at 347 (quoting Diamond v. Bland, 521 P.2d 460, 470 (Cal.) (Mosk, J., dis-
senting)), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
68. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 81, 88.
69. N.J. CONsT. art. I, § 6 provides: "Every person may freely speak, write and pub-
lish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law
shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."
70. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 628 (N.J. 1980). The Schmid court held that
Princeton University violated a nonstudent political activist's rights of expression under
the state constitution when it secured his arrest for distributing political literature on the
Princeton campus. Id. Like the California Supreme Court, the New Jersey Supreme
Court found that the text of its free speech provision was "more sweeping in scope than
the language of the First Amendment." Id. at 626.
71. Id. at 629-30. Among the factors that New Jersey courts must weigh in attempt-
ing to balance the competing rights are:
(1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private property, generally,
its "normal" use, (2) the extent and nature of the public's invitation to use that
property, and (3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken upon such
property in relation to both the private and public use of the property.
Id. at 630.
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C. Scope of Protection Under the Illinois Free Speech Provision
1. Legislative History
Since the inception of Illinois as a state, the people of Illinois
have placed a high priority on the protection of speech.7 2
Although the legislative histories of the constitutional conventions
prior to 1970 do not reveal the intended scope of the Illinois free
speech provision,73 the debates at the constitutional convention of
1970 do offer some insight into the framers' intent in adopting the
current free speech provision.
For example, at the 1970 Convention, one of the delegates pro-
posed a free speech amendment that would track the language of
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 74 The stated pur-
pose of adopting a free speech amendment that would parallel the
First Amendment was to eliminate any differences in construing
the Illinois and federal free speech provisions in favor of the First
Amendment. 75  The delegates supporting this amendment ex-
pressed concern that if the Illinois provision were to conflict with
the Federal Constitution, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution dictated that the Constitution would control.76
72. Article VIII, § 22 of the first Illinois Constitution provided in pertinent part:
"The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man,
and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for
the abuse of that liberty." ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 22. The Illinois Constitution
of 1848 substantially retained this provision. See generally GEORGE D. BRADEN &
RUBIN G. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 18 (1969). The first major changes to the language of the free speech provision
came in the Illinois Constitution of 1870. ILL. CONST., art. II, § 4 provided in pertinent
part: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of that liberty." The current constitution contains nearly identical wording.
See supra note 2.
73. See, e.g., 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 1567 (1870) (adopting the free speech provision of the
Illinois Constitution of 1870 without comment).
74. See 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS: SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION 3643 (1972) [hereinafter 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS] (proposed amendment of
Delegate Kinney that contained language "substantially the same as the United States
Constitution").
75. Id. In support of her amendment, Delegate Kinney stated:
[I]f we do adopt the language of the United States Constitution, there will be
no problem with uniform construction. All of these additional matters are de-
veloped by case law, and we can look to the cases construing the United States
Constitution and know where we stand and not be balancing peculiar provisions
or slightly different words to see if they do come out differently.
Id. She added that "above all [the proposed amendment] will give us uniform construc-
tion along the lines that we have honored and clung to since the beginning of our coun-
try." Id. at 3646.
76. See Id. at 3644. Delegate Ladd, who supported the Kinney amendment, stated:
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Before submitting the proposal to the Convention delegates, the
Bill of Rights Committee rejected this proposed language." Mem-
bers of the Bill of Rights Committee explained that their rejection
was based on the desire to adhere to principles of federalism and to
provide broader protection for speech under the Illinois Constitu-
tion than that which was available under the First Amendment. 78
The delegates, in turn, rejected the proposal in favor of retaining
the current language of the Illinois free speech provision.79
"I think that we all know that the Federal Constitution is going to prevail where there is
a conflict . I..." in making these comments, the delegates were correct in noting that if a
state constitution provides less protection than that available under an analogous provi-
sion of the Federal Constitution, the federal constitution prevails. However, the delegates
apparently failed to consider that state constitutions can provide greater rights than those
available under the Federal Constitution. Although it was not until 1980 that the
Supreme Court held that states could provide greater protection for speech than that
prescribed by the First Amendment, PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 81, 88, as of 1970 the Court
had held that states could provide broader protection for other individual liberties than
that offered by the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62
(1967) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection against unlawful search and seizure "does not affect [California's]
power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal
Constitution if it chooses to do so").
77. 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 74, at 3645-46 (statement of Delegate
Foster).
78. Id. at 3645; 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS: SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 1403 (1972) [hereinafter 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS]. Speaking for the
Bill of Rights Committee, Delegate Foster stated: "It's the purpose of the Constitution of
Illinois to describe the shape of Illinois government, and, therefore, if we simply relied on
the Federal Bill of Rights we would end up with a document that was grossly incom-
plete." 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 1403. He further explained the Commit-
tee's rationale for rejecting the proposed language:
The committee did consider [the Kinney amendment] and did debate it thor-
oughly .... We don't think it necessary that every state have a carbon copy of
the Federal Constitution. I seem to remember a Supreme Court case in which
they pointed out that the different states constituted, in a sense, laboratories
where different solutions to the same problems could be worked out.
4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 74, at 3645. The Chairman of the Bill of Rights
Committee, Elmer Gertz, was explicit in describing the Committee's desire to retain a
free speech provision that it felt was more protective than the First Amendment:
We [the Bill of Rights Committee] felt that there were certain elements added
by the more expansive language in the Illinois bill of rights, and we felt that
every protection that the citizen has by reason of the First Amendment, of
course, he would continue to have by reason of the Illinois language and per-
haps added protections in the field of libel and perhaps in other fields.
3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 1403. Gertz summarized the Committee's posi-
tion as follows: "[I]nsofar as we can have an Illinois law that does not do violence to the
Federal Constitution, we ought to have it." Id.
79. 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 74, at 3646.
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2. Decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court
Illinois courts have not had many opportunities to compare the
scope of protection under the Illinois free speech provision with
that of the First Amendment. 0 In the instances in which the Illi-
nois Supreme Court has addressed this issue, its remarks have re-
ferred only to the general scope of the Illinois provision, not to the
particular question of whether it limits the actions of private land-
owners. In Village of South Holland v. Stein,8' the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that the Illinois free speech provision
was "even more far-reaching" than the First Amendment. 2 The
court did not reach its conclusion after investigating the legislative
history behind the Illinois provision but based its conclusion exclu-
sively on a comparison between the texts of the Illinois provision
and the First Amendment. 3
Subsequently, in City of Blue Island v. Kozul,84 the court cited
Stein in holding that the city of Blue Island had violated the consti-
tutional guarantee of free speech when it arrested a Jehovah's Wit-
ness for disseminating religious literature without a permit in
violation of a Blue Island ordinance.8 5 Still, the Kozul decision
provided no further insight into how much more far-reaching that
protection might be, because the court ruled that the city's applica-
tion of its ordinance violated both the state and the federal
constitutions.86
The court's opinion in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United Re-
tail, Wholesale & Department Store Employees8 7 demonstrated the
court's continued adherence to construing the text of the Illinois
free speech provision as providing greater protection for expression
than the First Amendment. 8 In denying the plaintiff employer's
request that the defendant labor union be enjoined from distribut-
80. See Michael P. Seng, Freedom of Speech, Press and Assembly, and Freedom of
Religion under the Illinois Constitution, 21 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 91 (1989) [hereinafter
Seng]. Professor Seng's article contains an in-depth analysis of both the legislative his-
tory and case law regarding the Illinois free speech provision. Id. at 110-20.
81. 26 N.E.2d 868 (Ill. 1940).
82. Id. at 871. The court did not purport to decide just how much more protection
the Illinois provision provided, however, because the court ruled that the municipal ordi-
nance at issue in Stein violated both the First Amendment and the Illinois free speech
provision. Id.
83. Id.
84. 41 N.E.2d 515 (Ill. 1942).
85. Id. at 517, 520.
86. Id. at 520.
87. 79 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1948).
88. Id. at 50.
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ing allegedly libelous literature to employees, the court held that
such a prior restraint of publication would violate both the Illinois
free speech provision and the First Amendment. 9 Thus, as in
Stein and Kozul, the court's decision in Montgomery Ward does
not reveal just how much broader the protection of expression is
under the Illinois free speech provision than under the First
Amendment 0
D. Illinois Law in Other Areas Affecting Free Speech
1. The "Lockstep" Doctrine
In construing provisions of the Illinois Constitution, the Illinois
Supreme Court has historically followed the generally accepted
method of statutory construction, which consists of examining the
text and legislative history of the provision to determine the intent
of the framers. 91 Beginning in 1961, the Illinois Supreme Court
began to follow a method of construing the Illinois Constitution
that changed the focus of the court's inquiry.92 Rather than seek-
ing to discern the general intent of the framers of the particular
provision, the court attempted to determine whether the framers
had specifically intended the particular provision to provide
broader protection than that available under analogous provisions
89. Id. at 54.
90. Illinois Supreme Court Justice Clark has suggested an additional basis for con-
cluding that the Illinois Constitution's guarantee of free speech is broader than the First
Amendment guarantee. See People ex reL. Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 879-81 (Ill.
1988) (Clark, J., concurring). Instead of focusing on the textual differences between the
state and federal constitutions, Justice Clark concluded that with the Federal Constitu-
tion already before them, the drafters of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 would not have
adopted provisions analogous to those in the Federal Constitution had they not intended
the Illinois provisions to provide more far-reaching protection. Id. at 880-81.
91. See League of Women Voters v. County of Peoria, 520 N.E.2d 626, 629-30 (Ill.
1987); People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 161 (111. 1984) (Ward, J., concurring); People ex
rel. Kennan v. McGuane, 150 N.E.2d 168, 172 (Ill.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 828 (1958);
People ex rel. McDavid v. Barrett, 19 N.E.2d 356, 358 (Ill. 1939) (stating that "[i]n the
construction of the constitution courts should not indulge in speculation apart from the
spirit of the document, or apply so strict a construction as to exclude its real object and
intent." (citing Peabody v. Russell, 134 N.E. 148, 149 (Ill. 1922))).
92. See People v. Jackson, 176 N.E.2d 803, 805 (Ill. 1961) (holding that the Illinois
Supreme Court would "follow the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on iden-
tical State and Federal constitutional problems"), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962);
McAffee, supra note 9, at 7. The roots of this doctrine, at least in relation to the use of
the lockstep approach to interpret the Illinois Constitution's protection against warrant-
less searches and seizures, appear to reach back even further. See People v. Tillman, 116
N.E.2d 344, 346-47 (Ill. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 814 (1954), and cert. denied, 350
U.S. 1009 (1956); People v. Castree, 143 N.E. 112, 113-14, 117 (I11. 1924); McAffee,
supra note 9, at 7-8 & n.28.
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of the Federal Constitution.93 If the court found no evidence of the
framers' intent to provide broader protection, then the court inter-
preted the Illinois constitutional provision as providing the same
protection as that afforded by the Federal Constitution. 94 This
method of state constitutional interpretation has been termed the
"lockstep" doctrine.95 The court continued to use the lockstep ap-
proach to construe the Illinois Constitution throughout the
1980s, 96 when it interpreted the Illinois Constitution's protections
against self-incrimination, 97 warrantless searches, 98 and trial by
93. See, e.g., People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 461 N.E.2d 410, 412 (Ill. 1984) (basing its
holding upon the court's failure to find anything "in the proceedings of the [Illinois]
constitutional convention to indicate an intention to provide, in article I, section 10 [of
the Illinois Constitution], protections against self-incrimination broader than those of the
Constitution of the United States" (citation omitted)).
94. See, e.g., Joyce, 533 N.E.2d at 875 (noting that the court would "follow or be
bound by the construction placed on [a] Federal constitutional provision" unless the
court found "in the language of [the Illinois] constitution, or in the debates or committee
reports of the constitutional convention, an indication that a provision of our constitution
is intended to be construed differently than similar provisions of the Federal
Constitution").
95. See Joyce, 533 N.E.2d at 879 (Clark, J., concurring). The term Iockstep appears
to have been first used by Professor A.E. Dick Howard of the University of Virginia. See
McAffee, supra note 9, at 3 n. 11 (citing Howard, supra note 9, at 898). The use of this
doctrine has been heavily criticized, not only by commentators, but by Illinois Supreme
Court and appellate court justices. See Seng, supra note 80, at 120-22; McAffee, supra
note 9, at 33-46; Kangas, supra note 9, at 1282-90; Tisler, 469 N.E.2d at 163-64 (Clark,
J., concurring) (stating that "the majority's stance on [the lockstep] issue is dangerous
because it limits our power to interpret our own State Constitution"); People v. Hoskins,
461 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Ill.) (Simon, J., dissenting) (stating that "[w]hen a majority of the
United States Supreme Court has adopted an interpretation of the [Federal] Bill of Rights
that we believe is insufficiently ample to effectively implement those guarantees, we are
not frozen by it in interpreting the comparable provisions of our State Constitution"),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 840 (1984); People v. Exline, 456 N.E.2d 112, 116 (Ill. 1983)
(Goldenhersh, J., dissenting) (stating "we are not required to blindly follow the action
taken by the [U.S.] Supreme Court in determining the standards applicable under our
own constitution").
96. In a more recent case, however, the court did not follow the lockstep approach
when interpreting the scope of protection provided by Article I, § 2 of the Illinois Consti-
tution (the due process clause). See Rollins v. Ellwood, 565 N.E.2d 1302, 1316 (Ill.
1990). Instead of scouring the legislative history of the due process clause to determine
whether its framers intended that it provide broader protection than the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, the court simply concluded that the Illinois Constitu-
tion's guarantee of due process "stands separate and independent from the Federal guar-
antee of due process." Id.
97. Rolfingsmeyer, 461 N.E.2d at 412 (finding "nothing in the proceedings of the
[Illinois] constitutional convention to indicate an intention to provide . . . protections
against self-incrimination broader than those of the Constitution of the United States,"
and concluding that "[t]he record of proceedings reflects a general recognition and ac-
ceptance of interpretations by the United States Supreme Court").
98. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d at 155-57 (holding that because "the [Illinois constitutional]
convention manifested no intent to expand the nature of the protection afforded by the
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2. The Requirement of State Action in the Illinois Constitution
The notion that the Illinois Constitution limits only the actions
of the state government has long been generally accepted in Illi-
nois. °0 Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court has found that many
of the provisions of the Illinois Bill of Rights contain state action
requirements. 101 In only one case has an Illinois Court addressed
the state action requirement of the Illinois free speech provision.1 0 2
In Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., the plaintiffs brought an action
against their former employer, alleging that their discharge vio-
lated, inter alia, the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
the free speech provision of the Illinois Constitution. 103 In re-
jecting the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, the court stated that the
guarantee of free speech does not limit the actions of purely private
parties. 1°4
fourth amendment of the Federal Constitution," Article I, § 6 of the Illinois Constitution
provides the same protection against warrantless searches as the Fourth Amendment);
accord Hoskins, 461 N.E.2d at 945.
99. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873. Although it stated that it would adhere to the lockstep
approach, the court refused to interpret Article I, § 13 of the Illinois Constitution in the
same way as the analogous provision of the Federal Constitution, on the basis of what it
perceived as substantive textual differences in the two constitutions. Id. at 875-76, 879.
100. See, e.g., Peabody v. Russel, 134 N.E. 148, 149 (Ill. 1922) (stating that "[t]he
Constitution of this state is a limitation upon the power of the Legislature").
101. Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (Ill. 1985) (stating that the
Illinois Constitution's guarantees of freedom of speech, due process of law, equal protec-
tion, and privacy of communications are "limitations only on the power of government");
USA I Lehndorff Vermoegensverwaltung GmbH & Cie v. Cousins Club, Inc., 348
N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ill. 1976) (stating that "[wle are not persuaded by the defendant's con-
tention that the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution... prohibits an individual,
as well as the State, from depriving another of his property without due process of law");
People v. Smith, 390 N.E.2d 1356, 1363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (stating that "Article I,
Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution[,]... creating a right to freedom from invasions of
privacy[,] applies only to invasions of privacy by government or public officials").
102. See Barr, 478 N.E.2d at 1355-56.
103. Id. at 1355.
104. Id. at 1356 (noting that "[it is well established that the constitutional guarantee
of free speech is only a guarantee against abridgement by the government ... the Consti-
tution does not provide protection or redress against private individuals or corporations
which seek to abridge the free expression of others" (citations omitted)); cf Montgomery
Ward, 79 N.E.2d at 48 (referring to the "general principle" that "the constitutional guar-
anty of free speech as a general rule prohibits both the courts and the legislature from
putting previous restraints on publications").
If the court intended its statement in Barr to apply to the Illinois free speech provision
as well as to the First Amendment, its failure to support its conclusion by referring to text
or to legislative history is a glaring omission. For example, in finding that the Illinois
Constitution's guarantees of due process and freedom from invasion of privacy contained
a state action requirement, the Illinois Supreme Court cited affirmative evidence in the
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The implications of the court's statement in Barr for the Illinois
free speech provision are uncertain. Although the plaintiffs in Barr
brought a challenge to an Illinois statute pursuant to both the First
Amendment and the Illinois free speech provision, the court did
not reveal whether its comment on state action applied only to the
First Amendment, to the Illinois provision, or to both.' °5 It is
noteworthy that in support of this proposition, the court cited ex-
clusively to First Amendment cases, thus perhaps minimizing the
impact of its statement on the Illinois provision. 0 6
III. DISCUSSION
A. People v. DiGuida: The Facts of the Case
On December 12, 1987, Paul DiGuida attempted to solicit signa-
tures for a petition to nominate a candidate for the position of
Commissioner of the Cook County Board of Tax Appeals.107 This
otherwise noncontroversial activity acquired a dimension that dis-
tinguished it from other instances of solicitation: DiGuida engaged
in his solicitation activity on private property owned by Domi-
nick's Finer Foods, a supermarket.108 DiGuida stood in an area
located between the store entrance and the parking lot, separated
from the adjacent public sidewalk by a railing to prevent shopping
carts from being removed from Dominick's property. 0 9 DiGuida
conducted his solicitation approximately twenty-five feet from
Dominick's entrance and did not prevent any patrons from enter-
ing the store."10
Ted Scanlon, Dominick's manager, told DiGuida that he was on
Dominick's property, that Dominick's did not permit solicitation,
and that he would have to leave the premises."' When DiGuida
legislative history of each provision that the framers intended those provisions to apply to
state action only. USA 1, 348 N.E.2d at 835 (referring to due process); Smith, 390
N.E.2d at 1363 (referring to freedom from invasions of privacy).
105. Barr, 478 N.E.2d at 1356.
106. Id.
107. People v. DiGuida, 576 N.E.2d 126, 127 (I11. App. Ct. 1991), rev'd, 604 N.E.2d
336 (I11. 1992).
108. DiGuida 1, 576 N.E.2d at 127.
109. DiGuida II, 604 N.E.2d at 337; DiGuida 1, 576 N.E.2d at 127.
110. DiGuida 1, 576 N.E.2d at 127.
111. DiGuida 11, 604 N.E.2d at 337; DiGuida 1, 576 N.E.2d at 127. Although Scan-
Ion testified at trial that Dominick's maintained a "no solicitation" policy, DiGuida 1, 576
N.E.2d at 128, he later admitted on cross-examination that Dominick's allowed solicita-
tion when the store had granted permission. Id. Scanlon's testimony further revealed
that Dominick's permitted political candidates to greet patrons inside the store, main-
tained a bulletin board inside the store on which members of the community could post
messages, and did not post signs outside the store warning that solicitation was forbidden
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refused to leave, Scanlon summoned the police, who arrested
DiGuida for criminal trespass to land.112 At trial, the judge con-
victed DiGuida of misdemeanor criminal trespass to land, rejecting
DiGuida's argument that the First Amendment protected his ac-
tivities. 13 The trial court sentenced DiGuida to twenty hours of
community service.1 1 4
B. The Opinion of the Appellate Court
DiGuida appealed his conviction under the theory that the Illi-
nois trespass statute, as applied to his case, violated the free speech
provision of the Illinois Constitution.1 5 After reviewing the cur-
rent status of the law regarding the protection of speech on private
property under the First Amendment, 16 the court concluded that
because the only Illinois decision on point 7 had been decided
solely on First Amendment grounds, that decision did not control
DiGuida's claims." 1 8
Next, the court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had held'1 9
that states were free to interpret the free speech provisions of their
without permission. Id. One witness testified that she had been permitted to collect
signatures on at least 20 previous occasions, both inside and outside the store, without
being arrested or told to leave. DiGuida H, 604 N.E.2d at 338; DiGuida I, 576 N.E.2d at
128.
112. DiGuida HI, 604 N.E.2d at 338; DiGuida 1, 576 N.E.2d at 128. The Illinois
criminal trespass statute in effect when Diguida was arrested, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 21-3(a) (1987), provided:
Whoever enters upon the land or a building, other than a residence, or any
part thereof of another, after receiving, prior to such entry, notice from the
owner or occupant that such entry is forbidden, or remains upon the land or in
a building, other than a residence, of another after receiving notice from the
owner or occupant to depart, commits a Class C misdemeanor.
The statute further stated that oral notification by the owner or occupant satisfies the
requirements of § 21-3(a). See id.
113. DiGuida H, 604 N.E.2d at 338; DiGuida I, 576 N.E.2d at 128.
114. DiGuida H, 604 N.E.2d at 338; DiGuida I, 576 N.E.2d at 128.
115. DiGuida I, 576 N.E.2d at 127. DiGuida also raised the claims that the Illinois
trespass statute as applied to his case violated Article I, § 2 (equal protection clause) and
Article III, § 3 (free and equal elections provision) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.
Id. Because this Note seeks only to investigate the Illinois Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Illinois free speech provision, the courts' analyses of DiGuida's equal protec-
tion and free and equal election arguments will not be addressed.
116. DiGuida 1, 576 N.E.2d at 128-30.
117. See People v. Sterling, 287 N.E.2d 711, 714 (Ill. 1972) (following Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), in holding that defendants convicted of trespassing on the
grounds of a private shopping center had no First Amendment right to distribute political
literature when the literature had no relation to the private property and other alterna-
tives to disseminate the material existed).
118. DiGuida I, 576 N.E.2d at 130-31.
119. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 88 (1980).
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state constitutions as providing more protection for expressive ac-
tivity on private property than that provided by the First Amend-
ment.120 Surveying decisions by Illinois appellate courts, the court
concluded that Illinois law was moving away from following the
lockstep doctrine when construing provisions of the Illinois
Constitution. 121
The court identified previous statements by the Illinois Supreme
Court and indications in the legislative history that the language of
the Illinois free speech provision provided greater protection than
that afforded by the First Amendment. 122 The court therefore held
that, like the free speech provisions in the California and Washing-
ton constitutions, 2 3 the Illinois free speech provision differed from
the First Amendment in that it did not contain a state action re-
quirement.1 24 Accordingly, the court held that DiGuida's actions
were protected from infringement by Dominick's; Dominick's had
violated DiGuida's free speech rights under the Illinois Constitu-
tion by preventing DiGuida from engaging in expressive speech on
its property while permitting others to engage in the identical
activity. 125
C. The Opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appel-
120. DiGuida 1, 576 N.E.2d at 132-33. States are free to interpret their free speech
provisions more broadly than they interpret the First Amendment unless the correspond-
ing restrictions on an owner's use of his property contravene any federal constitutional
provision, such as the Takings or Due Process Clauses. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 81.
121. DiGuida I, 576 N.E.2d at 133-34.
122. Id. at 134-35.
123. For its interpretation of Washington's approach to this issue, the court relied on
Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108, 115-16 (Wash. 1981)
(en banc) (holding that the Washington free speech provision does not contain a state
action requirement). Although the appellate court did not cite subsequent decisions of
the Washington Supreme Court, in 1989 the Washington court abandoned its interpreta-
tion in Alderwood that the Washington free speech provision did not contain a state ac-
tion requirement. See Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm.,
780 P.2d 1282, 1285, (Wash. 1989).
124. DiGuida 1, 576 N.E.2d at 134-35 (citing Robins v. PruneYard, 592 P.2d 341
(Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d
590 (Mass. 1983); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980); and Alderwood, 635 P.2d
108)). The court further rested its conclusion on the textual similarities between the
Illinois, Washington, and California free speech provisions, and on the textual differences
between the Illinois provision and the First Amendment. DiGuida I, 576 N.E.2d at 135.
Moreover, the court held that, even assuming arguendo that the Illinois free speech
provision contained a state action requirement, Dominick's use of the state's criminal
trespass laws constituted the requisite state action. Id. at 135, 137 (citing Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)).
125. DiGuida I, 576 N.E.2d at 137.
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late court. Regarding the protection afforded by the Illinois free
speech provision, 26 the court held that: (1) although the protec-
tion of speech under the Illinois provision is not limited to the pro-
tection afforded by the First Amendment in all circumstances, the
Illinois free speech provision contains a state action requirement
identical to that of the First Amendment;127 (2) the invocation of
the Illinois criminal trespass statute by a private landowner does
not constitute state action;1 28 and (3) because Dominick's did not
assume such a public aspect that it became a public forum for free
expression, the company was permitted to restrict the speech rights
of those who desired to engage in expressive activity on its
property. 29
The court identified the central issue for review as whether the
Illinois free speech provision prohibited Dominick's from using the
Illinois trespass statute to exclude DiGuida from its property. 3 0
In its analysis, the court first provided a summary of cases in which
the U.S. Supreme Court had defined the extent to which the First
Amendment protects expression on the property of others.'
Next, the court analyzed the decisions of other states that had in-
terpreted the protection afforded by their respective speech provi-
sions. 32 The court divided the decisions into two groups and
identified one group of states that provided greater free speech
rights than those available under the First Amendment, 33 and an-
other group that provided no more protection than that available
126. The court also held that the use of the Illinois trespass statute in this situation
did not violate the equal protection and free and equal election provisions of the state
constitution. DiGuida II, 604 N.E.2d at 347-49.
127. Id. at 344.
128. Id. at 345-46.
129. Id. at 347.
130. Id. at 337.
131. DiGuida II, 604 N.E.2d at 338-40. Although the court noted that DiGuida had
not raised any federal claims, the court extensively discussed the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of First Amendment protection of expression on private property. Id. at 338, 342.
The court also agreed with the appellate court and the parties that its decision in Ster-
ling did not control the outcome of this case, because Sterling had been decided "exclu-
sively under the first and fourteenth amendments [of the Federal Constitution]." Id. at
344 (citing Sterling, 287 N.E.2d at 711). The court did note, however, that one aspect of
federal law was controlling: under the Supreme Court's holding in PruneYard, a state
may provide more generous protection under its state constitution than that available
under the Federal Constitution. DiGuida II, 604 N.E.2d at 340.
132. Id. at 340-42.
133. Id. at 340-41 (citing Robins, 592 P.2d at 341; Bock v. Westminster Mall Co.,
819 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991); and Schmid, 423 A.2d at 615). The court also noted the deci-
sions of courts in Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington, which held that those states'
initiative and free elections provisions protected the right to collect signatures for polit-
ical petitions in large privately owned shopping centers. Id. (citing Batchelder, 445
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under the First Amendment. 134
After investigating the treatment of the right to expression on
private property under the First Amendment and under the consti-
tutions of other states, the court began its analysis of the protection
afforded by the Illinois free speech provision. In conducting this
analysis, the court faced the threshold issue of whether it should
follow the lockstep doctrine in interpreting the Illinois free speech
provision. 3 DiGuida and various amici curiae argued that the
court should abandon its adherence to the lockstep doctrine and
construe the Illinois provision without regard to the U.S. Supreme
Court's interpretation of the rights protected by the First Amend-
ment.1 36 As the court noted, if it chose to follow lockstep in this
case, DiGuida's rights under the Illinois Constitution would be no
greater than they would be under the Federal Constitution. 37 The
court, however, rejected the contention that it had always chosen
to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's application of the Federal Con-
stitution in construing the state constitution.138
The court stated that it had adhered to the principle that "where
the language of the State constitution, or where debates and com-
mittee reports of the constitutional convention show that the
Framers intended a different construction, it will construe similar
provisions in a different way from that of the [U.S.] Supreme
Court." ' 39 The court noted that, according to this principle, it had
previously interpreted several provisions of the Illinois Constitu-
tion differently from their analogues in the Federal Constitution. 14o
N.E.2d at 590; State v. Cargill, 786 P.2d 208 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); and Alderwood, 635
P.2d at 108).
134. Id. at 341-42 (citing Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 469 A.2d 1201 (Conn.
1984); Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337 (Mich. 1985); SHAD
Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Felmet, 273 S.E.2d
708 (N.C. 1981); Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1986)).
135. Id. at 342.
136. DiGuida 11, 604 N.E.2d at 342.
137. Id. Because DiGuida conceded that his actions were not protected by the U.S.
Constitution, id., had the court explicitly decided at the outset to follow federal law, it
would not have needed to proceed any further.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147 (I11. 1984)).
140. Id. at 342-43 (citing Village of South Holland v. Stein, 26 N.E.2d 868 (I11. 1940)(holding that the Illinois free speech provision provides broader protection to unlicensed
solicitors of publication subscriptions than is available under the First Amendment); Peo-
ple ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873 (11. 1988) (holding that the Illinois Constitu-
tion does not give the prosecution in certain felony drug cases the right to a jury trial,
although the Federal Constitution gives the prosecution such a right); and Rollins v.
Ellwood, 565 N.E.2d 1302 (I11. 1990) (holding that the due process clause of the Illinois
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Therefore, the court embarked on an analysis of the legislative his-
tory and text of the Illinois free speech provision to determine the
scope of protection that the framers had intended. 141
The court identified language in the transcripts of the proceed-
ings of the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention indicating that
the Illinois free speech provision granted broader protection for
speech than did the First Amendment.1 42 Despite this language,
the court determined that the transcripts of the constitutional con-
vention proceedings did not conclusively support the idea that the
Illinois free speech provision provided broader protection than the
First Amendment. 143
Turning to the text of the Illinois free speech provision, the court
noted that the language adopted by the framers of the Illinois pro-
vision differed from that of the First Amendment.'" The court
concluded, however, that these textual differences were also not
enough to establish that the free speech provision was intended to
provide broader protection than the First Amendment by limiting
the actions of private parties. 14 5 Indeed, the court identified previ-
ous decisions in which it had held that other provisions of the Illi-
nois Constitution contained a state action requirement, even
though the text of those provisions, like the text of the free speech
provision, did not explicitly state that the provisions applied solely
to government action. 146
Thus, basing its decision on the lack of evidence showing that
Constitution is to be interpreted differently than the guarantee of due process provided by
the Federal Constitution) (order of citation in original)).
Likewise, the court identified instances in which the absence of an indication in the text
or legislative history of an Illinois constitutional provision that the provision was to be
construed differently than its federal counterpart had led the court to interpret the state
provision in the same way that the Supreme Court had interpreted the similar federal
provision. Id. at 342 (citing People v. Hoskins, 461 N.E.2d 941 (I11.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 840 (1984); and People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 461 N.E.2d 410 (Ill. 1984)).
141. DiGuida I1, 604 N.E.2d at 343-45.
142. Id. at 343. The court quoted the statement of Elmer Gertz, Chairman of the
Bill of Rights Committee. For the text of this statement, see supra note 78.
143. The Illinois court read the legislative history as indicating only that the Illinois
free speech provision "may" provide broader free speech rights on private property than
those provided by the First Amendment. DiGuida 11, 604 N.E.2d at 343.
144. Id. Specifically, the First Amendment contains an explicit prohibition on the
actions of government, whereas the Illinois provision does not. 1d.
145. Id. at 344.
146. Id. at 343-44 (citing Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354 (Ill. 1985);
USA I Lehndorff Vermoegensverwaltung GmbH & Cie v. Cousins Club, Inc., 348
N.E.2d 831 (Ill. 1976); and People v. Smith, 390 N.E.2d 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)). For a
discussion of the court's holdings in these cases, see supra note 101 and accompanying
text.
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the Illinois free speech provision was intended to limit the actions
of private parties, the DiGuida court concluded that the free
speech provision contains a state action requirement.'4 7 The court
further held that the state action requirement of the Illinois free
speech provision is the same as that in the First Amendment. 48
The court found support for this conclusion in the "well-estab-
lished constitutional doctrine" of both Illinois and other states.'49
The accepted role of the Illinois Bill of Rights, the court noted, is
to "prevent either legislatures or courts from any interference with
or deprivation of the rights therein declared and guarantied."'' 50
The court also found the decisions of jurisdictions that had inter-
preted their state constitutions as limiting only government action
more persuasive than the decisions of jurisdictions that had inter-
preted their state constitutions as also placing limitations on pri-
vate parties. 51 Therefore, the court rejected the appellate court's
reliance on the textual similarity between the Illinois free speech
provision and the analogous Washington and California provi-
sions. 152 As the court noted, the Pennsylvania, Michigan, and New
York provisions also contained "substantially" the same wording
147. Id. at 344.
148. DiGuida 11, 604 N.E.2d at 344. Even though it held that the First Amend-
ment's state action requirement applies to the Illinois free speech provision, the court
rejected the notion that the Illinois free speech provision is, in all circumstances, to be
interpreted as providing no greater protection for expression than the First Amendment
does. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting People ex rel. Decatur & State Line Ry. Co. v. McRoberts, 62 Ill.
38, 41 (1871)). The court also identified materials drafted in preparation for the 1970
Illinois Constitutional Convention and statements of delegates to the Convention which
failed to contain "any stated intention that the constitution should attempt to set out the
rights and powers of private individuals in their relations with others." Id.
151. Id. at 344-45. Among the states that require state action to raise a state consti-
tutional claim, the court identified Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania. Id. at 344.
The court noted that California and Washington, in contrast, allowed plaintiffs to bring
state constitutional claims against private parties in certain circumstances. Id.
The court's more favorable view of the decisions from the states holding that their free
speech provisions contain a state action requirement is revealed in part by its quotation of
the following language from a decision of the New York Court of Appeals:
Actions of the Federal Government are limited by the Federal Constitution's
reservation to State governments of all powers not expressly granted it. State
governments are not similarly restrained. State constitutional provisions, there-
fore, protect the individual liberty by limiting the plenary power of the State
over its citizens. Thus, State action is a crucial foundation for both private
autonomy and separation of powers.
Id. at 345 (quoting SHAD Alliance, 488 N.E.2d at 1215-16 (citations omitted)).
152. Id. at 344-45. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5 provides: "Every person may freely
speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right."
For the text of the California free speech provision, see supra note 56.
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as the Illinois provision, yet those states' free speech provisions
limited only state actors. 153 Thus, implicit in the DiGuida court's
analysis is the unstated conclusion that it did not consider Califor-
nia's interpretation of its free speech provision to be persuasive. 154
On balance, the court concluded that, on the basis of the legislative
history and text of the Illinois free speech provision, previous deci-
sions of Illinois courts, established constitutional doctrine, and per-
suasive authority from other jurisdictions, the Illinois provision
contains the same state action requirement as the one present in
the First Amendment. 5'
After determining that the Illinois provision contains a state ac-
tion requirement, the court turned to the question of whether
Dominick's use of the state trespass law rose to the level of state
action. 156 The court rejected the authorities on which the appellate
court had relied in reaching the conclusion that state action was
present. 157 Instead, it noted that there was no connection between
the reason for DiGuida's arrest and prosecution and his expressive
activities; he was arrested and prosecuted because he remained on
private property after its owner had requested that he leave.' 58
Furthermore, the court stated that public policy supported a rejec-
tion of state action in the present circumstances-if state action
were found to exist, this finding would encourage the use of self-
help to rid one's property of trespassers.'59
Finally, the court examined whether, despite the absence of state
action, DiGuida's speech was nevertheless protected because
Dominick's had become a forum for public expression. 16° In re-
jecting this contention, the court noted that Dominick's was a free-
standing store and was not as large as a shopping center, nor had
any governmental agency been involved in the construction or op-
153. DiGuida II, 604 N.E.2d at 344.
154. See id. at 344-45 (noting the similarity between the free speech provision of
Illinois and those of Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania).
155. Id. at 345.
156. Id.
157. Id. The appellate court had relied on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) to reach the conclusion that the use
of the Illinois criminal trespass laws against DiGuida constituted state action. Id. The
Supreme Court rejected the logic of Shelley, commenting that its reasoning had fallen
into disfavor. Id. The court also distinguished Sullivan, concluding that in that case the
use of a state law imposed a prior restraint on the speaker, whereas DiGuida was pun-
ished not for his actual speech or activities but for trespassing. Id.
158. DiGuida H, 604 N.E.2d at 345.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 346.
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eration of the store.' 61 The court further found that the previous
activities of solicitors at Dominick's, the absence of No Soliciting
signs on the premises, and the presence of a public bulletin board
inside the store did not transform Dominick's into a public fo-
rum. 162 Thus, the court concluded that because the property
owned by Dominick's was not public or quasi-public, the Illinois
free speech provision did not prohibit Dominick's from excluding
DiGuida from its property.' 63
IV. ANALYSIS
The DiGuida court's decision contains two inconsistent state-
ments regarding the state action requirement, which make the
opinion a bewildering interpretation of the Illinois free speech pro-
vision. The court purported to articulate the First Amendment's
state action requirement as the standard for state action under the
Illinois free speech provision;' 6' nevertheless, the court's later
statement that it had pursued an analysis "independent" of analo-
gous First Amendment cases16 puts the court's earlier emphasis
on the First Amendment's state action requirement in considerable
doubt. Because the Illinois court examined several factors not
taken into consideration in analogous First Amendment cases, 66
the inconsistencies in the court's statements should be resolved in
favor of the conclusion that the state action requirement of the Illi-
nois free speech provision is not precisely that of the First Amend-
ment. Indeed, the DiGuida decision seems to have established an
exception to state action under the Illinois free speech provision
that does not simply follow First Amendment law but is instead
based more upon the state action standards of the free speech pro-
visions of other states.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. DiGuida II, 604 N.E.2d at 347.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. The court's inquiry into "whether Dominick's had taken on such a public aspect
that it became a forum for free expression" is an analysis that does not reflect the course
of inquiry pursued in analogous First Amendment cases. Compare DiGuida II, 604
N.E.2d at 346- 48 (considering, inter alia, whether the property was a free-standing store
or a shopping center, whether government funds were used to build or maintain the prop-
erty, and whether the property owner had given speakers the impression that its property
was open to expressive activities) with Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505, 507-508
(1946) (considering whether the private property owner was the functional equivalent of
a municipality).
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A. The Court's Problematic State Action Analysis
The most serious flaws in the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion
are its contradictory statements regarding a central issue in the
DiGuida case: the nature of the state action requirement of the
Illinois free speech provision.1 67 Although it is possible that the
internal inconsistencies of the DiGuida opinion were simply the
result of an inadvertent statement,1 68 it is more likely that the con-
tradictions resulted, in part, from the method of analysis used by
the court to interpret the Illinois free speech provision.
1. The Court's Approach to Interpreting the Illinois
Constitution
Initially, the court considered how to interpret the Illinois free
speech provision in the particular context of the DiGuida case.
The court appropriately began its analysis by looking to the legisla-
tive history and text of the free speech provision to determine the
intent of the framers.' 69 The court followed the lockstep method of
construing the Illinois Constitution, which required it to determine
whether the framers intended the Illinois free speech provision to
167. See DiGuida I, 604 N.E.2d at 344. Before reaching this issue, the court initially
had to determine whether the Illinois free speech provision contained any state action
requirement at all. The court found that the legislative history of the Illinois free speech
provision was inconclusive about whether the provision was intended to limit the actions
of private parties as well as those of the government. Id. The court therefore turned to
other legislative history and case law regarding the general role of the Illinois Constitu-
tion vis-i-vis the government. Id. at 344-45.
The cases cited by the court to support its decision to read a state action requirement
into the Illinois free speech provision are of dubious precedential value, for in those cases
the court either simply construed the Illinois constitutional provision in the same way
that the U.S. Supreme Court had interpreted analogous provision of the Federal Consti-
tution, or found that the legislative history of the Illinois constitutional provision con-
tained a positive statement that the particular provision was not intended to apply to
private parties. See supra notes 104, 106, 146 and accompanying text.
The legislative history cited by the court, however, provides ample support for the
conclusion that the Illinois Constitution generally was intended to limit only governmen-
tal actions and not the actions of private individuals. See DiGuida II, 604 N.E.2d at 344-
45; see also supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text (discussing the pertinent legislative
history). Thus, on the basis of this legislative history, the court's decision to read a state
action requirement into the Illinois free speech provision was appropriate and, as the
court recognized, was consistent with generally accepted constitutional doctrine.
DiGuida H, 604 N.E.2d at 345.
168. It is possible, for example, that by stating that "the State action requirement of
the first amendment is also present in Article I, section 4 of the Illinois Constitution,"
DiGuida HI, 604 N.E.2d at 344, the court simply meant that the Illinois free speech provi-
sion, like the First Amendment, contains a state action requirement, but that the court
did not intend to imply that those requirements were identical.
169. See supra notes 141-43 and infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
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be construed differently from its analogue in the Federal Constitu-
tion-the First Amendment.7 0 This method of analysis required
the court to discern whether the framers intended the Illinois free
speech provision to limit the actions of private landowners. Failing
to find conclusive evidence in the text or in the legislative history
demonstrating that this was indeed the framers' intent, the court
concluded that "the State action requirement of the first amend-
ment is also present in Article I, Section 4, of the Illinois
Constitution." '7
Although some aspects of this method of constitutional interpre-
tation were appropriate, the analysis contained two major flaws
that led inevitably to the court's conclusion. First, by starting its
investigation from a premise that required it to find affirmative evi-
dence that the framers intended the Illinois free speech provision to
limit the actions of private landowners, the court engaged in an
inquiry that was too narrow and therefore almost certain to prove
fruitless. The Illinois Constitution is not intended to be a code;
therefore, neither the text nor the legislative history of its individ-
ual provisions can be expected to address each and every possible
implication of those provisions. 7 2 Because no Illinois court had
previously considered a case involving the particular issue in
DiGuida, it is unlikely that the framers would have anticipated and
addressed the application of the Illinois free speech provision to
private landowners.
Furthermore, the narrow focus of the court's inquiry under the
lockstep approach led it to disregard or downplay evidence that
strongly suggested that the Illinois free speech provision should be
170. DiGuida II, 604 N.E.2d at 342. As the court summarized its method,
[W]here the language of the State constitution, or where debates and committee
reports of the constitutional convention show that the Framers intended a dif-
ferent construction, it will construe similar provisions in a different way from
that of the [U.S.] Supreme Court.
Id. (citing People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147 (Ill. 1984)).
171. Id. at 344.
172. See, e.g., Tisler, 469 N.E.2d at 165 (Clark, J., specially concurring). Justice
Clark vehemently disagreed with the Illinois Supreme Court's reluctance to interpret the
Illinois Constitution independently of the Federal Constitution in the absence of affirma-
tive evidence showing that the framers of the Illinois Constitution intended it to provide
broader protection than that provided by the Federal Constitution. He noted that:
The Illinois Constitution, like the United States Constitution, is a living docu-
ment .... I believe that the absence of certain comments at the Illinois constitu-
tional convention should not tie our hands. The Illinois Constitution . . . is
framed in general terms to prevent the document from being 19,000 pages long
and to retain flexibility to deal with unforeseen questions.
Id. (citations omitted).
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interpreted independently of the First Amendment. For example,
the court ignored the introduction and rejection of the proposed
Kinney amendment, which would have conformed the wording of
the Illinois free speech provision to that of the First Amend-
ment. 173 The proponents of this amendment championed their
proposal specifically on the grounds that it would establish the
First Amendment as the single measure of expressive rights under
both the Illinois and the Federal constitutions. Significantly, the
delegates to the Convention spumed the proposed amendment.
Rejection of the Kinney amendment, coupled with the state-
ments of the Chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee, 174 demon-
strates that the delegates to the constitutional convention intended
the Illinois free speech provision to be construed independently of
the First Amendment. Accordingly, because the DiGuida court's
inquiry focused solely on identifying affirmative evidence demon-
strating that the framers intended the Illinois free speech provision
to limit the actions of private actors, the court overlooked evidence
that contradicted the court's finding that the Illinois provision in-
corporated the state action requirement of the First Amendment.
The court's failure to adequately consider this evidence high-
lights another flaw in the court's method of constitutional interpre-
tation. The lockstep approach used by the court to interpret the
Illinois free speech provision led to its failure to find evidence of an
intent to diverge from the First Amendment. 17  Essentially, the
court followed a doctrine of constitutional interpretation that con-
tained a rebuttable presumption that provisions of the Illinois Con-
stitution should be construed like analogous provisions of the
173. For a more thorough discussion of the debates on the Kinney Amendment at the
1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention, see supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
174. The court acknowledged statements by the Chairman of the Bill of Rights Com-
mittee at the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention indicating that the Committee in-
tended the Illinois free speech provision to provide broader protection than that of the
First Amendment. DiGuida H, 604 N.E.2d at 343.
175. The DiGuida court did engage in an analysis that, on its face, made it appear as
though the court based its conclusion regarding state action on a variety of persuasive
authority. Among the sources on which the Illinois court purportedly based its holding
were decisions from other jurisdictions, accepted constitutional doctrine, and previous
decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court on related issues. Id. at 344. A closer scrutiny of
the court's analysis, however, provides scant support for any claim that the court's con-
clusion rested on logic other than federal constitutional doctrine.
For example, the court reached its conclusion that the First Amendment state action
requirement was present in the Illinois free speech provision before it ever considered any
"well established constitutional doctrine." See id. Moreover, the only previous decision
in which the court had considered whether the Illinois free speech provision contained a
state action requirement was based exclusively on First Amendment principles. See Barr
v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (Ill. 1985).
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Federal Constitution.1 76  Predictably, once the DiGuida court
failed to find persuasive evidence that the Illinois free speech provi-
sion was intended to limit the actions of private parties, the court
concluded that the state action requirement of the First Amend-
ment was also present in the Illinois free speech provision.
Although giving Illinois constitutional provisions the same effect
as similar federal constitutional provisions is indeed the appropri-
ate result when the framers have indicated that this was their in-
tent, the court's method of analysis stands the principle of
federalism on its head. 17 7 For example, when the legislative history
of an Illinois constitutional provision contains affirmative evidence
indicating that the framers intended the provision to be construed
like an analogous federal constitutional provision, the method of
interpretation that the court followed in DiGuida will achieve the
correct result. When the delegates to the Illinois Constitutional
Convention have soundly rejected the notion that an Illinois provi-
sion is to be construed like its federal analogue, however, the
DiGuida court's method can result in an interpretation of the Illi-
nois provision that is precisely the opposite of that intended by its
drafters. Thus, the court's method of analysis, which presumes
that provisions of the Illinois Constitution should be construed like
similar provisions of the Federal Constitution, ignores an even
more important doctrine: courts "are not legislatures, and neither
are they constitutional framers and adopters of constitutions."' 7 s
Instead, courts should give effect to the will of the people of Illinois
as expressed through their elected representatives. 79
2. The Court's Application of the State Action Requirement
Despite its reference to the lockstep doctrine in the DiGuida
176. See People ex rel Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 879 (Ill. 1988) (Clark, J.,
concurring) ("[I]f the provisions [of the state and federal constitutions] are 'similar' it
must be presumed that construction of the Federal provision controls.... [T]he lockstep
principle can be rebutted with evidence that the State provision is intended to be con-
strued 'differently'-.e., more broadly.").
177. See, e.g., People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 461 N.E.2d 410, 413 (Ill. 1984) (Simon, J.,
specially concurring) (stating that the assumption "that a guarantee in the bill of rights of
our State Constitution has the same content as the comparable guarantee in the Federal
Constitution unless there is some indication to the contrary in the proceedings of the
constitutional convention ...is the reverse of the correct one and inverts the proper
relationship between the State and Federal constitutions").
178. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d at 161 (Ward, J., concurring).
179. See id. at 161 (Ward, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he fundamental principle
of constitutional construction is that effect must be given to the intent of the framers of
the organic law and of the people adopting it. This is the polestar in the construction of
constitutions" (quoting 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 92, at 418 (1979))).
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opinion and its clear statement that the state action requirement of
the Illinois free speech provision is coextensive with the First
Amendment, the Illinois Supreme Court appears to have estab-
lished an exception to the state action requirement that is quite
different from the First Amendment's public function exception.
The structure of the DiGuida court's analysis belies the notion that
the court actually adhered strictly to a First Amendment state ac-
tion inquiry. Instead, the court appears to have concocted its own
exception to the state action requirement of the Illinois free speech
provision; and that exception appears free of any First Amendment
influences.
After it had decided that the Illinois free speech provision con-
tains the same state action requirement as the First Amendment,
the court engaged in a determination of whether state action was
present in DiGuida. '8o Curiously, once the court had dismissed the
notion that the enforcement of a trespass statute by police officers
constituted state action, 8' the court did not simply conclude that
there was no constitutional violation. Instead, delving into a new
line of analysis, the court considered "whether Dominick's itself
had taken on such a public aspect that it became a forum for free
expression."'' 8 2 This factor had not been considered in analogous
First Amendment cases. 18 3
The court's public forum inquiry does bear at least some resem-
blance to the public function analysis that the U.S. Supreme Court
has established as the state action exception in analogous cases
arising under the First Amendment. For example, in Marsh the
U.S. Supreme Court sought to determine whether certain private
property had taken on such a public aspect that it had essentially
functioned as a municipality. Similarly, in DiGuida the court at-
tempted to gauge the extent to which Dominick's property as-
sumed a public aspect. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court in Marsh,
however, the Illinois court did not seek to determine whether
Dominick's performed the same functions as a municipality. In-
stead, the court focused on the degree to which Dominick's had
180. DiGuida H, 604 N.E.2d at 345.
181. Id. at 346.
182. Id.
183. In cases involving free speech rights on private property under the First Amend-
ment, federal law currently holds that a private party's prohibition of expressive conduct
on its property rises to the level of state action only when the private party assumes a
"public function." For an explanation of the public function doctrine, see supra notes 17-
35 and accompanying text. Marsh was the one instance in which the U.S. Supreme Court
held that a private landowner satisfied the public function requirement and thus rose to
the level of a state actor. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507-09.
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opened its property as a "forum for public expression. '
In pursuing this public forum type of analysis-perhaps more
appropriately termed the "public invitation" doctrine-the court's
inquiry primarily sought to determine whether Dominick's had
given DiGuida the impression that its property was public in na-
ture and was open to the public for expressive activities.18 The
court concluded that the lack of No Soliciting signs and the pres-
ence of a bulletin board on which Dominick's customers could
"advertise or request services and items for sale" did not transform
the store into a public forum.186 Moreover, the previous use of the
same property by another person to collect signatures for political
petitions was held to be insufficient to make Dominick's a forum
for free expression. Is' These factors are similar to those that courts
of other states have considered in interpreting their constitu-
tions.188 Thus, the DiGuida decision places Illinois among those
states that have not simply followed the U.S. Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of First Amendment protection of expression on pri-
vate property but that have instead followed a situational analysis
of the type of property involved.
The Illinois court's divergence from traditional public function
analysis in analogous First Amendment cases may simply have
been the result of the court's confusion over the public forum and
the public function doctrines.8 9 It is more likely, however, that
184. DiGuida II, 604 N.E.2d at 346.
185. Id.
186. Id. Oddly, the court concluded that a bulletin board on which customers could
post commercial messages was not "a mechanism for the exchange of ideas." Id. This
statement conflicts with the widely accepted view that commercial speech is not wholly
outside constitutional protection. E.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) ("Our question is whether speech
which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction' is so removed from any
,exposition of ideas' . . . that it lacks all [First Amendment] protection. Our answer is
that it does not." (citations omitted)).
187. DiGuida H, 604 N.E.2d at 346. The reasoning that the court used to arrive at
this conclusion is suspect. For example, despite the absence of any such testimony, the
court was willing to "infer" that the solicitors who had preceded DiGuida in soliciting on
Dominick's property "had asked for and received permission to be on Dominick's prop-
erty." Id. The court then stated that "[a] search of the record does not reveal whether
[DiGuida] asked Dominick's for permission." Id. Thus, by reading inferences into the
testimony, the court casually dismissed a rather significant factor-DiGuida's justifiable
reliance on the practices that Dominick's had permitted in the past.
188. For a more thorough discussion of those states' approaches to this issue, see
supra notes 36-71 and accompanying text.
189. Many state courts have confused these disparate First Amendment doctrines.
See Berger, supra note 3, at 634-35. The public function principle holds that the state
action requirement of the First Amendment may be excepted in situations in which a
private actor has assumed functions that are normally performed by the government. See
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this course of analysis was a deliberate departure from the tradi-
tional test for state action under the First Amendment. Indeed, at
the conclusion of its analysis the court unequivocally stated that it
had conducted its analysis "independent of that given cases de-
cided by the [U.S.] Supreme Court under the first and fourteenth
amendments."' 90 Thus, despite seemingly contradictory state-
ments regarding the state action requirement of the Illinois free
speech provision and its continued reference to the lockstep doc-
trine, the Illinois Supreme Court has apparently established an ex-
ception to the state action requirement of the Illinois free speech
provision distinct from that of the First Amendment.
V. IMPACT
Because of the confused nature of the Illinois court's analysis,
the impact of certain portions of the court's decision in DiGuida is
difficult to assess. It is likely, however, that the DiGuida opinion
will serve as important precedent in two areas of Illinois law: (1)
most obviously, in the jurisprudence arising out of the Illinois free
speech provision, and (2) in the method that Illinois courts use to
interpret provisions of the Illinois Constitution.
A. Impact on the Illinois Free Speech Provision
Only two certainties emerge from the DiGuida opinion: (1) the
Illinois free speech provision contains some type of state action re-
discussion of Marsh, 326 U.S. 501, supra notes 13-17. To date, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that this doctrine applies only to a private property owner who "perform[s] the
full spectrum of municipal powers and [stands] in the shoes of the State." Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972) (citing Marsh, 326 U.S. 501). Thus, the public function
doctrine seeks to determine whether private property has assumed such a public charac-
ter that it should be treated as public property under the Federal Constitution.
Public forum doctrine, in contrast, involves the proposition that "[o]nce [public prop-
erty] is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit
others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say." NOWAK,
supra note 17, § 16.47, at 973 (quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
96 (1972)). Therefore, the public forum doctrine is a means by which courts categorize
public property according to the traditional use and intended purpose of that type of
property, and, on the basis of that categorization, determine the extent to which the gov-
ernment may regulate expression on that property. See International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705-06 (1992). But see id. at 2718 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (rejecting the majority's "forum based" analysis in favor of an ap-
proach that would accord property public forum status when "the objective, physical
characteristics of the property at issue and the actual public access and uses which have
been permitted by the government indicate that expressive activity would be appropriate
and compatible with those uses").
190. DiGuida H, 604 N.E.2d at 347.
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quirement 9t ; and (2) the actions of police officers in enforcing the
Illinois trespass statute do not constitute state action. 192 Certainly,
in the wake of the DiGuida opinion, those who wish to bring a
constitutional claim against an actor other than a government offi-
cial for violating their rights under the Illinois free speech provi-
sion must demonstrate that the actor's interference rises to the
level of "state action." Just what types of action will satisfy the
state action test under the Illinois free speech provision remains an
open question.
The uncertainty lies in whether the words of the Illinois
Supreme Court should be taken at face value or whether the true
holding of the opinion must be sought in the structure of the
court's analysis. If the court chooses to refer to its language that
the Illinois free speech provision and the First Amendment contain
the same state action requirement, 193 then the Illinois free speech
provision cannot act as a limitation on private parties unless, as in
Marsh v. Alabama, the operation of the property by the parties
assumes a public function. Because the only private landowner
that has been held to satisfy this test was the owner of a company
town, it is extremely unlikely that those seeking to engage in ex-
pression on the property of another would ever be able to find pro-
tection under the Illinois free speech provision.1 94 If, on the other
hand, as the structure of the court's analysis and the language of
the opinion indicate, the First Amendment's public function doc-
trine is not the end of the state action inquiry under the Illinois free
speech provision-a result that is certainly more consistent with
the legislative history-the Illinois Constitution may indeed pro-
tect speech on some types of private property.
After DiGuida, the apparent test to determine whether a private
property owner fits within the exception to the state action require-
ment of the Illinois free speech provision involves an analysis of
whether the property owner has opened his property to expressive
activities or has given the impression that the property is public in
nature. Clearly, the absence of prohibitory signs, the previous use
of the property for expressive activity by others, and the mainte-
nance of a bulletin board for posting commercial messages will not
be sufficient to invoke this exception. It is likely, however, that
191. Id. at 345.
192. Id. at 346.
193. See id. at 344.
194. The U.S. Supreme Court tacitly recognized as much, noting as far back as 1972
that the company-owned town was "an anachronism long prevalent in some southern
States and now rarely found." Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 558 (1972).
1993]
Loyola University Law Journal
given a set of circumstances involving a much larger property that
is more open to the public-such as a shopping mall or a large
private university-the Illinois Supreme Court may be willing to
find that the Illinois Constitution protects expression on that
property.
B. Impact on Interpreting the Illinois Constitution
The DiGuida opinion reveals the Illinois Supreme Court's con-
tinued divergence from the lockstep method of construing the Illi-
nois Constitution. Although the opinion pays lip service to the
imperative of following the lockstep approach, 95 the court's failure
to examine whether Dominick's assumed a public function shows
that the court may no longer blindly follow the U.S. Supreme
Court on Illinois constitutional issues, or at least on questions in-
volving the Illinois free speech provision. Instead, the court is now
apparently willing to pursue "an analysis independent of that given
cases decided by the Supreme Court under the first and fourteenth
amendments." 9 6
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite its statement that the state action requirement of the Illi-
nois free speech provision is that of the First Amendment, in
DiGuida the Illinois Supreme Court pursued a line of analysis that
demonstrates a departure from First Amendment law. By estab-
lishing an exception to the state action requirement of the Illinois
free speech provision that appears to be much broader than the
exception recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Illinois court
has taken a positive step toward expanding the rights of persons
who wish to engage in expressive activity in Illinois. Moreover,
despite proclaimed adherence to the lockstep doctrine, the Illinois
Supreme Court has demonstrated a renewed willingness to assert
the independence of the Illinois Constitution.
DOUGLAS M. POLAND
195. DiGuida II, 604 N.E.2d at 342.
196. Id. at 347.
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